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Technology transfer costs have a profound influence on the firm’s entry mode into a production 
sharing relationship. To explore this nexus, we associate technological complexity of the off-
shored input with the organizational mode of international production sharing by extending the 
Antràs (2005) model. We modify the Antràs model by proposing that the low-tech input, as 
qualified within the model, cannot be produced in the low wage south without costly technology 
transfer. The cost of technology transfer in turn depends on three factors, which are the 
technological complexity of this input, the absorptive capacity of the host country and the wages 
of the host country. Our model refines the results obtained in Antràs (2005). We find that  
1. For high-tech goods, intra-firm transfer is preferred vis-à-vis outsourcing only for 
intermediate range of technological complexity of the off-shored input,  
2.  On the other hand, for low-tech goods, where the likelihood of outsourcing is higher in 
Antràs, intra-firm offshore contract is still possible for low range of technological 
complexity.  
Our model has policy suggestions for host countries which aspire to maximize their benefits 
from the exploding global production phenomenon. As the wage gap between the source and 
the host country falls, cost considerations for offshoring disappear. New sources of comparative 
advantage should therefore be created in the host country by subsidizing technology investment 
and higher education to build higher absorptive capacity. 
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Section 1: Introduction  
 
In the early stage of production fragmentation, every firm faces the “make or buy” 
choice. The importance of this decision is reflected in the recent proliferation of internalization 
literature relating to foreign sourcing. Current research on the theory of international sourcing 
has revealed that the organizational structure of the multinational firm is influenced by the 
degree of standardization of the good, factor intensity of the offshored input, intensity of the 
offshored input in final good, productivity of sourcing firms, legal framework, and market 
thickness in the host country. One common denominator across all these factors is that they 
crucially impact the cost borne by the sourcing firm. Surprisingly, the cost of technology transfer 
– transmission and assimilation –  that has been central to the theory of multinational 
corporations (MNC) since the last three and half decade has been overlooked with regard to 
vertical production transfer. This paper fills the gap by incorporating the cost emanating from 
technology transfer in Antràs (2005) model and thus relating the internalization decision of a firm 
to the technological complexity of the offshored input and the wages and absorptive capacity of 
the host country.  
Technology transfer costs are as crucial in a vertical relationship as in horizontal FDI or 
licensing. Particularly, in an outsourcing transaction with an unaffiliated supplier, assimilation 
costs are significant. A survey of Indian Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) vendors (The 
Hindu Business Line, 2005) reveals that 25.2% of total wage cost is spent on training of its 
employees to produce inputs of the quality standards set by its buyer. Arora et al (2000) in their 
extensive fieldwork on Indian software BPO industry find that a significant amount of specialized 
training for all employees, including the skilled employees, is undertaken after recruitment which 
lasts on an average for 2-3 months. In 2004, Caliber Point Business Solutions Limited, a third 
party BPO service provider to Hexaware Technologies, made substantial investments in 
technology infrastructure like fiber optic technology for the backbone of Local area Network, Dell 
Intel Xeon Servers and Network Security using Stonegate Firewall and IDS and Tata Honeywell 
CCTV.  
We introduce product/firm specific technology transfer cost for the offshored fragment in 
the Antràs (2005) model thereby introducing heterogeneity across firms manufacturing a single 
product or products of a single firm.  The cost of technology transfer varies with the 
technological sophistication of the offshored input. If a firm has n products whose offshored 
input differ in their technological complexity, then, internalization decision will vary for each of 
these products. Alternatively, if all firms in the market have only one product that differ in the 
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technology it employs for producing its offshored input, then again, firms diverge in their 
decision to internalize. We differentiate between vertical foreign direct investment (VFDI) and 
international outsourcing (IO) in the usual Grossman-Hart-Moore way of contractual bargaining 
power. Using evidence from existing studies on horizontal relationships and current offshoring 
surveys, we distinguish between intra-firm and arm’s length production contract with respect to 
the technology transfer cost borne by the sourcing firm in the two alternative modes. The 
technology transfer cost incurred by a sourcing firm in an internal production transfer is 
substantial and is a part of its relationship specific investment (RSI), while the subsidiary 
manager has little incentive to invest in technology assimilation. On the same note, if the 
offshore production is contracted to an outside supplier, then the supplier has to incur a 
significant proportion of the technology transfer costs while the sourcing firm has little motivation 
to bear the costs of technology transmission. Technology transfer costs are a function of the 
complexity of technology used to produce the off-shored input, the absorptive capacity of the 
host country and its wage rate. Since the technology transfer costs borne by the sourcing firm 
varies with its organizational mode, so naturally internalization decision becomes a function of 
technological complexity of the input, host country absorptive capacity and the wages.  
Several studies have found a correspondence between the complexity of a product 
(whole or the fragment being offshored) and the firm’s organizational structure. Based on field 
research conducted in the US, Singapore, UK and India, Aron and Singh (2002) find that lower 
end processes like data transformation or customer service which embody less complex skills 
are outsourced to a third party. On the other hand, complex inputs in the global value chain are 
offshored to an affiliated supplier. Gereffi et al (2003) describe five organizational forms of 
fragmented production based on case studies in the bicycles, apparel, horticulture and 
electronics industries. They also conclude that high complexity of a good is compatible with 
intra-firm transaction unless the supplier capability is high. Davidson and McFetridge (1985) 
studied transactions involving high-tech products of 32 US based multinational companies 
(MNC) between 1945 and 1975. Their logit estimates indicated that the probability of 
internalization is higher for transactions involving products with newer technology. Most of these 
studies focus on transaction cost economies to explain the linear relationship between the 
tendency for vertical integration and higher technological complexity of the input. These models 
however do not explain the rising demand for medical electronics, designs of digital devices 
bought from Asian manufacturers by Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, and Philips but sold under 
their own brand names. 
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In Antràs (2005) model, the decision to internalize depends on the intensity of low-tech 
input (the offshored input) in final product. A low intensity of the offshored input implies lesser 
contribution by the supplier in total surplus and property rights theory dictates that it is optimal 
for sourcing firm to get the residual rights of control and hence intra-firm relationship emerges. 
On the other hand, a high intensity of offshored input implies greater contribution by the supplier 
in total surplus and optimization results in an outsourcing contract. We extend Antràs (2005) 
model by intertwining the role of intensity of the offshored input and technological complexity of 
this input. Given the absorptive capacity of the host country, our model reveals that at high 
relative home country wages, a good with low intensity of offshored input, is more likely to get 
offshored through intra-firm transactions only for intermediate range of technological complexity. 
At low and high levels of technological complexity, the sourcing firm is better off engaging an 
unaffiliated supplier to produce the offshored input. The intuition for this result is as follows. 
When the intensity of offshored good is low, then by Antràs (2005) model there is greater 
probability for production transfer to occur via the VFDI mode. This makes the profitability of the 
sourcing firm in the VFDI mode more sensitive to technological complexity thereby choosing an 
affiliated supplier only for intermediate range of technological complexity. By making an intra-
firm transfer, the sourcing firm faces lower host country wages and lower contractual costs but 
higher costs of technology transfer vis-à-vis outsourcing. At low technological complexity, the 
distortion in technology transfer investment by the supplier is low, while at high technological 
complexity the savings from technology transfer cost forces the sourcing firm to choose an 
unaffiliated supplier. If the intensity of the offshored input is high, then, the intra-firm production 
transfer is preferred to outsourcing at low technological complexity of the offshored input.  In 
both the case, however, outsourcing is preferred to VFDI at high technological complexity of the 
offshored input. Our result is empirically testified in Borga and Zeile (2004) where the volume of 
intra-firm trade falls with increasing R&D intensity of the affiliate
1.  
Our model highlights the possibility of different trends that can emerge in the 
organizational structure of fragmented production. We have observed offshoring relationships of 
the form “Build-Operate-Transfer” whereby a sourcing firm initially establishes an outsourcing 
relationship with an unaffiliated supplier and then at a later stage takes over the offshoring unit 
to make it a captive one. Our model predicts that relationship of this form will most likely 
transpire for the high-tech goods as in case Aviva Plc. Our model, on the other hand, also 
                                                 
1 The evidence from Borga and Zeile (2004) is relevant to this paper only to the extent that the intra-firm trade they are talking about 
is the import of inputs from the parent firm to the affiliate for further processing. 
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predicts that a transformation from captive to third party as exemplified by General Electric India 
operations, but by and large for low-tech goods.    
The model delivers implications for policy on technology and absorptive capacity in the 
host country. In real world, we do not observe outsourcing of inputs embodying complex 
technology on a wide scale. If the host country government subsidizes technology investment 
by the domestic vendors, then there is higher probability of an outsourcing contract for 
technologically complex input, given the level of absorptive capacity. Moreover, if a host country 
enlarges its absorptive capacity by heavy investment in education to build its comparative 
advantage in inputs embodying complex technology, then they stand to gain by getting more 
value-added work through both VFDI and outsourcing. 
The paper beyond this point is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
associated with this research area. In section 3 we develop the model and discuss the 
consequences of introducing technology transfer costs in the Antràs (2005) model. Section 4 
discusses the results of the model and section 5 makes a conclusion. 
 
Section 2: Related Literature 
 
In this section, we intend to assimilate internalization literature with the literature on technology 
transfer costs and contract theory. Several studies have examined the horizontal mode of entry 
by a multinational in the presence technology transfer costs. For example Mattoo, Olarreagaz 
and Saggi (2004) build a theoretical model where establishing a subsidiary is preferred to 
acquisition of domestic firm if the cost of technology transfer is high. This is because a high cost 
of transferring technology to the acquired firm is associated with a smaller cost advantage over 
domestic firms and a high acquisition price. Based on the information obtained for twenty-six 
projects of U.S. firms in chemicals and petroleum refining and machinery, Teece (1977) finds 
that cost due to technology transmission can range from about 20%-80% of a project costs. In 
our paper, we propose that the burden of this cost can be shifted by transferring ownership 
share and therefore impact the internalization decision of a firm.  
A major stumbling block in relating technology transfer literature to internalization 
decision in fragmentation is that there is little research on vertical transfer of technology and the 
related costs. Therefore, we have to rely on studies relating to horizontal technology transfer. 
Horizontal technology transfer models do not offer much evidence on the cost sharing pattern 
between the transferor and the transferee or the resource cost of technology absorption by 
recipient firms. Recently, several instances from BPOs and sourcing firms, as cited in the 
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introduction confirm our belief that technology absorption is also a substantial proportion of 
costs and hence may impact internalization decision of the sourcing firm. Thus, we need to rely 
on a combination of horizontal technology transfer research, information based on case studies 
of BPOs and captive offshored production units (VFDI), reports or surveys published in popular 
media. 
The other strand of literature which we incorporate in our model is contract theory which 
has been known to influence the sourcing firm’s decision to internalize since Grossman and 
Hart (1986). Incompleteness of contracts is an inevitable feature that sets in when transaction 
happens between two independent entities as in case of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Antràs 
(2003, 2005). With incomplete contracts, these models show that the bargaining power of the 
MNC is higher with VFDI mode vis-à-vis outsourcing. Besides this difference between VFDI and 
outsourcing, Antràs and Helpman (2004) also emphasize that the organizational fixed costs is 
higher for VFDI. In such an economy, more productive firms venture into VFDI. Based on 
evidence provided by Dunning (1993), Antràs (2003) assumes that if a good requires RSI in 
capital and labor, then the sourcing firm always contributes to capital investment. This implies 
that for a capital-intensive good, the sourcing firm contributes more to aggregate surplus and 
optimality requires integration with the supplier. Antràs (2005) is also based on the same 
principle as Antràs (2003) where the two inputs are labeled as high-tech and low-tech instead of 
capital and labor. The sourcing firm makes RSI in high-tech input and therefore we expect intra-
firm production transfers for high-tech good. However, with time, as the intensity of high-tech 
input falls, it can be outsourced. This highlights that the degree of standardization is also higher 
for a product that is outsourced relative to a product that is produced by a MNC subsidiary.  
To understand these two strands of research together in one framework, we split 
technology transfer costs into transmission and assimilation costs. Transmission cost is the cost 
to shift codified knowledge like blueprint, formulas, management techniques customer list, or 
tacit knowledge like know-how, information gained from experience which is usually borne by 
the transferor. Assimilation cost is the expenditure on R&D by the supplier, cost of training 
workers to adapt to new technology, or acquiring new technology from technology market. 
These costs are typically borne by the recipient firms unless the host government makes it 
mandatory for the investing foreign firm to make investment on technology absorption or 
acquisition.  
For the VFDI mode, we would expect high technology transmission costs in proportion to 
technology assimilation cost. This is justified by the high bargaining power of the parent firm in 
an intra-firm transaction which induces it to invest in costly technology transmission but at the 
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same time reduces the incentive of the subsidiary manager to invest in assimilation of the 
technology. Our insight is spelled out in the survey by Chuang and Chang (1993) on foreign 
affiliates and domestic licensee firms (and joint ventures) in Taiwanese pharmaceutical industry. 
They find that foreign subsidiaries in the host country do not give much importance to the cost of 
technology transfer in their profitability analysis. At the same time, licensee firms are very 
careful about the cost of technology. Their results are explained by emphasizing that domestic 
firms rely on external market to channel the ingestion of technology and thus have to bear 
pecuniary expenditure and adaptation costs. On the other hand, a subsidiary obtains technology 
from its parent firm which precludes any transaction in the technology market, and therefore has 
little incentive to assimilate technology or its costs.  
Teece (1977) survey found that technologies closer to the frontier are transferred to a 
subsidiary vis-à-vis an arm’s length agent. Since the cost of transferring technology is positively 
related to its age, a parent firm spends more resources for transmitting technology to a 
subsidiary vis-à-vis an arm’s length unit. UNCTC (1987) also finds empirical evidence in the 
cases of US and German firms where intra-firm technology transfer is far more significant than 
that taking place between independent parties. This is a reflection of the MNC preference 
towards fully controlling the assets transferred to overseas establishments. Since full control of 
technology transferred is not granted in case of an arm’s length contract, the MNCs may not 
prefer to bear the costs of technology transferred to an arm’s length agent.  
In the current context, technology transfer by a sourcing firm to an outside supplier may 
also be limited by the fact that a third party vendor (TPV) usually has more than one client. 
Therefore, if a client transfers its technology to the supplier, it undertakes a risk that its 
technology maybe used by the supplier to serve other clients as well. Therefore, any rational 
sourcing firm will not transfer its technology to its TPV to the extent possible. Hence, the TPV 
has to invest on its own training and technology acquisition contrary to a captive (subsidiary) 
unit which can depend on its parent firm for technology. Examples can be found in the Indian 
third party BPO companies like VisualSoft Technologies Ltd, Zensar Technologies, iGate Global 
Solutions etc. who have to spend a considerable proportion of their revenues on technology 
acquisition and absorption.  
Since a sourcing firm has little incentive to invest in technology transmission in an arm’s 
length relationship, it is therefore the technology assimilation and acquisition costs which gain 
more importance. This is also supported by the Grossman and Hart theory relating to the 
bargaining power of the unaffiliated supplier vis-à-vis the affiliated one.  Chudnovsky (1991) 
report on north-south technology transfer finds that technical assistance to local suppliers is 
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crucial for meeting their performance metric, however, this is precisely the area where 
assistance from technology providers are missing. Egan and Mody (1992) find that in a 
subcontracting relationship the buyer is willing to transmit only the minimum information 
required to get the product out of the production cycle. If the product must adhere to stringent 
quality specifications before being accepted, then it is entirely left to the supplier’s discretion to 
take up the contract, get involved in the manufacturing process and produce the good of 
requisite quality at lowest possible cost. Thus, the supplier incurs most of the technology 
transfer or adaptation expenditure. Our assumption is implicit in a theoretical model by Bartel et 
al (2005). An increase in the rate of technological change, in their model, increases outsourcing 
because it allows the sourcing firms to use the services of the supplier based on leading edge 
technologies without incurring the sunk costs of adopting these new technologies. The 
assumption implicit in their analysis is that it is always the supplier of the input who subsumes 
the cost of technology in an outsourcing relationship.  
Assumption 1: In case of VFDI, the parent firm incurs a significant share technology transfer 
costs, while in case of outsourcing, it is the unaffiliated input supplier who bears a large 
proportion of this cost.  
 
Section 3: The Model: 
 
Consider a world with two countries – the developed north and the low wage south and a good y 
produced with labor only. We borrow demand function and production function from Antràs 
(2005) model, given by (1) and (2) respectively. Consumer preferences are such that a unique 
producer, i





) ( ) ( i p i y           ( 1 )  
Where p(i) is the price of good y(i) and λ is a given parameter known to the producer. 
The final good y is produced using two inputs, high-tech, , and low-tech, , with intensity (1-
z) and z respectively.     

























         ( 2 )  
By assumption, the South lacks the capability to produce the high-tech input like R&D. Thus, it 
is only the low-tech input that can be offshored. Unlike Antràs
3 (2005), the production of the low-
                                                 
2 Firms in Antràs (2005) model are homogeneous and hence the subscript i is not present in his model. 
3 In his model, there is a one to one relationship between labor and output of low tech input. 
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tech input depends not only on the employment of labor,  , but also on the labor 
productivity, , where A(i) is the firm specific or product specific technological complexity 
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A high level of A(i) implies a more advanced technology within the class of technologies 
available in the technology market
4. In Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006), more advanced 
technology is implicitly more productive. Aron and Singh (2002) explain the concept of revenue 
distance, where a higher revenue distance of a production stage implies lower contribution to 
revenue and value-addition, and hence lower productivity. In their model, inputs using less 
complex skills have large revenue distances and hence lower productivity.  
To ease interpretation of A(i) and how it is different from z,, we can consider an example 
from a consulting firm. A consulting project can be treated as a final good y, produced using two 
inputs -  and  . A consultant’s strategic analysis of the client’s problem is a high-tech input, 
an input available in the north only, while data analysis of the client is a low tech input which can 
be offshored. If the consulting project requires relatively less amount of data analysis vis-à-vis a 
consultant’s strategic analysis, then the project is intensive in high-tech input and the parameter 
z is low for such a project. Data analysis for the project can be done using two techniques, 
varying in their technological complexity - SAS or excel. Technological complexity, A(i), for SAS 
is higher than A(i) for Excel and accordingly, efficiency for data analysis is higher in SAS.  
h x l x
In the above example, i refer to the different kinds of consulting projects handled by a firm, one 
that requires sophisticated data analysis and the other that doesn’t. Our model shows that 
variation in technological complexity of the low-tech input across projects induces difference in 
their organizational modes. 





l l L i A T x =             ) 3 ( ′  








x l l l l l l L L x L x x L x x = = = = = 1 , , 0 0 ,  
                                                 
4 The technology that we refer to in case of offshoring is typically a standardized one, available in the technology market.  
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A(i)  = 0 means that the technological complexity of the offshored input is too low to justify 
production in the South, and A(i)  = 1, implies that high technological complexity makes 
productivity of southern labor high enough to match the productivity of the northern labor. 
If technological sophistication adds to productivity, it cannot come without cost. A higher 
level of technological complexity has to be matched by a corresponding rise in efforts to transmit 
and assimilate the technology. In the example of the consulting project discussed above, there 
are costs of running data analysis in SAS – license costs and training costs. Excel, which has a 
lower technological complexity, has a lower technological transfer cost vis-à-vis SAS. This is 
straightforward and follows directly from Teece (1977) observation that more recent technology 
embodying more complex mechanisms require more resources to be transferred – whether they 
are transmitted by the sourcing firm or have to be acquired, technology transfer cost is a 
positive function of technological complexity. Teece (1977) study supports our view that 
technologies closer to the frontier embody more complex mechanisms and hence require more 
resources to be transferred.  
In addition to this cost, Chuan and Chang (1993) model suggests that technology 
transfer cost may also depend on many factors and most interestingly on the mode of 
technology transfer, absorptive capacity of host country and the level of technological 
development of the host country. To endogenize the technology transfer cost with respect to the 
mode of organizing production fragmentation, we use assumption 1. The buyer (supplier) 
understands that there is little incentive for the supplier (buyer) to invest in technology 
assimilation (transmission) in an intra-firm (external) production contract and hence she decides 
to take a small fixed payment,   
S TT ( )
N TT  from the supplier (buyer) in lieu of its unverifiable 
and insignificant investment in technology transfer. In case of an intra-firm (external) production 
transfer, the technology transfer cost incurred by the buyer (supplier) is given by C, defined 
below in equation (4), while in an outsourcing contract (VFDI), the buyer (supplier) incurs a 
small fixed cost, 
N TT ( )
S TT . To simplify algebra, and without loss of generality, we assume 
that these fixed payments are insignificant and close to 0.  
Assumption 3: .  0 , 0 ≈ ≈
S N TT TT
 
Absorptive capacity of the host country has been cited as crucial to technology transfer 
costs by Baranson (1970), Mattoo et al (2005), Teece (1977), Pack and Saggi (1997). Eicher 
and Kalaitzidakis (1997), model the host country absorptive capacity and emphasize the 
importance of local human capital necessary to absorb FDI technology. Long (2005) deals with 
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the issue of training cost in fragmented production. However, our model differs from his in two 
aspects. We endogenize the technology transfer cost and then relate it to the issue of 
internalization. Per contra, Long (2005) focuses on explaining incomplete offshoring to a low 
wage nation in the presence of exogenous training costs.  In our model, we propose that to 
produce low tech input in the south, there is an additional cost of equipping each southern labor 
employed to produce the low-tech input with the firm or product specific technology. The 
technology transfer cost whether transmission or assimilation depends on the host country 
wages, its absorptive capacity and the technological complexity of producing the low-tech input. 
Assumption 4: The functional form for technology transfer cost is the same irrespective of the 
mode of organization of fragmented production. 
( ) () [ ] i A w q C C




















Where q(.), the efficiency of technology transfer, is a function of wages in the south, , 
and the absorptive capacity of the host country,
S w
ξ . Higher wages imply higher productivity of 
labor
5 and hence efficiency in absorbing the transferred technology. At the same time, the 
inherent capability of the population measured by, say, the educational standard is also a crucial 
factor in determining the efficiency of transfer. This hypothesis has been supported by Teece 
(1977) study which found a negative relationship between cost of transferring technology and 
host country’s absorptive capacity. Usually, all countries maintain some statistics on the human 
capital figures like R&D, literacy rate, skilled labor to unskilled labor ratio or investment on 
human capital formation. Thus, a sourcing firm can form a perception of the absorptive capacity 
of the country hosting its production.  
By assuming a linear production function for  , we get a linear cost function.  l x
             ( 4 )   () () ( [ ξ , ˆ S w q C i A C Ω = ) ]
                                                
As in Antràs (2005), we consider three possible organizational forms: (1) Vertical integration in 
the North/ Domestic outsourcing (DO) (2) Unaffiliated Supplier in the South: Outsourcing and (3) 






5 This can also be rationalized by using the efficiency wage theory; however, we choose not to use this terminology as wages in our 
model are exogenous. 
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Vertical Integration or outsourcing in the North 
 
Antràs (2005) assumes that vertical integration and domestic outsourcing in the north 
are equivalent because of complete contract enforcement. To maintain this supposition in our 
model we need to additionally assume that all firms in the north have identical absorptive 
capacity and hence require no technology transfer to produce the low-tech input. Demand and 
production function is given by (1) and (2) respectively. Assuming that one unit of labor 








N x w x w x x − − = Π
− − α α α α ζ λ
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z z
z z z
− − − − =
) 1 ( 1
α ζ  
This case is exactly the same as in Antràs (2005). Profit maximizing price and equilibrium profit 






















N w            ( 5 b )  
International Outsourcing- Unaffiliated supplier in south 
 
Assumption 1 and 3 together imply that the technology transfer cost in an outsourcing 
relationship is borne by the supplier. The RSI for the sourcing firm comprises of its commitment 
to producing the high tech input only.  
Assumption 5: As in Antràs (2005), competition among southern suppliers of low-tech input 
drives their profit to zero.  
 
A transfer payment, T, from the supplier to the sourcing firm has to be allowed for such that the 
profit of the outsourcing partner is driven to zero. The profit function for the sourcing firm 
outsourcing to a TPV in the south is: 
() T x w x x










+ − = Π
− − α α α α ζ λ φ
φ
) 1 ( 1  
Where R denotes the total revenue from the relationship and φ  is the share of the sourcing firm 
in the total value of the relationship. It is also a measure of the bargaining power of the sourcing 
firm. 
In Antràs (2003) model, RSI by the supplier (sourcing firm) is in labor (capital) 
investment while in Antràs (2005) it is the resources committed to produce the low tech (high-
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tech) input. Besides the RSI in low-tech or high-tech input production, our model has an 
additional component of RSI which is incurred by the supplier or the sourcing firm contingent on 
the organizational mode. The supplier (sourcing firm) has to make RSI in technology transfer 
costs in case of outsourcing (VFDI).  
The unaffiliated supplier maximizes: 
()
() () () ()() []
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x x
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α α α α  Using   and (4) we get:  ) 3 ( ′












w q C i A w
S
S S ξ is the Average Efficiency cost (AEC), adjusted for 
productivity for producing   the low tech input.   l x
Profit maximization of the two agents and setting T so as to make the supplier break 
even leads to the following expression for the sourcing firm’s ex ante profits and profit 
maximizing price in IO equilibrium: 




















































           ( 6 b )  
The profit maximizing price in Antràs (2005) when outsourcing is chosen is given by: 
() ()
z z









           ( 6 c )  
Our price equation, (6b), is analogous to the above equation except that the southern 
production cost is augmented to include the technology transfer costs, adjusted for productivity 







= Θ1  
International outsourcing is preferred to domestic outsourcing in north if  1 1< Θ ,that is,  











































































Assumption 6: To further simplify algebra, we assume that  ( ) [ ] ξ , ˆ S w q C  is linearly separable in 
and 
S w ξ . 
 That is, () [] () ξ ξ C w w q C
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That is, the elasticity of the cost of technology transfer with respect to technological 
sophistication,  A(i), is equal to the weighted elasticity of productivity of southern labor with 
respect  to  the  technological complexity weighted by 












1 . Lets define the 
technological complexity at which (8) holds to be  .  
*
,o i A
Proposition 1: The function reaches minima at  when 
*











Mathematically, the cost function is convex with respect to the technological complexity and the 
productivity function is concave, then second order conditions confirm our assertion that ( ) S w
AEC  
is a convex function. 
Intuitively, the proposition implies that at lower levels of technological complexity, the increment 
to productivity is higher than the increment to technology transfer costs. At higher level of 
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technological complexity, the increment to technology transfer costs is much larger than its 
contribution to increasing southern productivity. One can justify this because had the technology 
transfer cost not be prohibitively high, one would have observed the offshoring of advanced 
stages of production as well.  













ξ falls for low levels of technological complexity, A(i) <  . For 
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Figure 1: Tradeoff between northern production and International Outsourcing 
 
The sourcing firm stands to gain from IO vis-à-vis DO due to lower host country wages while it 
stands to lose due to costs from contractual distortions and suboptimal RSI in technology 
transfer. Any technological complexity below  o A ) (i implies a greater distortion due to incomplete 
contracts than it saves costs due to cheap southern labor. Similarly, any A(i) above 
o A ) (i increases technology adaptation cost more than it adds to productivity and also increases 
distortions due to incomplete contracts. 
Proposition 2: Only at intermediate levels of technological complexity is international 
outsourcing preferred to domestic outsourcing. At low and high levels of technological 
sophistication, domestic outsourcing dominates international outsourcing. 
 
Proposition 3: To host outsourcing contracts with the full range of technological complexity, the 
host country should possess a minimum level of absorptive capacity. Analogously, the range of 
                                                 
6 The curvature and slope of the curve depends on parameters like  ξ φ α and z   , ,
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technological complexity available for outsourcing can be increased if the absorptive capacity is 
raised. 
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. Thus outsourcing expands at both ends with a rise in absorptive capacity. 
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Vertical Integrated supplier in the South or VFDI 
 
We retain Hart-Moore (1990) premise that the sourcing firm has a right to higher share in 
surplus (bargaining power) in an intra-firm transaction vis-à-vis a market transaction. This 
assumption is given mathematically in Antràs (2005) as: 
()
α α δ φ δ φ − + = 1 > φ            ( 9 )  
Where  δ is the proportion of output expropriated by the sourcing firm if the manager of the 
subsidiary is fired. In Antràs (2005), the expression for the profit maximizing price in case of 
VFDI is analogous to equation (6c) with φ  replaced by φ .  
In our model, the multinational firm assumes the technology transfer costs to train the labor in a 
VFDI contract. As in outsourcing, T′ is set such that competition among suppliers drive their 
profit down to zero. The profit function of a multinational is given by: 
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RSI on the part of the integrated supplier comprises of its resources committed to produce the 
low-tech input only with insignificant expenditure on technology absorption. The subsidiary 
manager maximizes: 
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In case of VFDI, the presence of technology transfer cost does not distort prices since they are 
incurred by the multinationals while the amount of southern labor employed is determined by the 
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subsidiary. Thus, technology transfer cost is like a fixed cost to the multinational. Equilibrium 
profit of the MNC is given by: 
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Assumption 7: Let φ = ½ as in Antràs (2005) 
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Per contra,  >0 for all range of A(i). This result comes by because in case of outsourcing it is 
the unaffiliated supplier that makes RSI in technology transfer, while the resulting gain in 
productivity is also enjoyed by the sourcing firm. In case of VFDI, the MNC makes RSI in 
technology transfer, while both parties enjoy the productivity gain.   
N
o Π
Proposition 4: The sourcing firm stands to lose from VFDI (in absolute terms) if the 
technological complexity of the low-tech input is higher than a critical level, b defined in (11). 
 
To evaluate the relative prevalence of VFDI vis-à-vis DO we compare (10) with (5b), the 
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7 For z>½ or z<½,the numerator is always positive. 
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Let the level of technological complexity at which 
() ) (i A ∂
Ψ ∂ = 0 be  . 
*
, f i A
The first term in the above total derivative denotes the effect of increase in technological 
complexity on technology transfer costs, which is positive and the second term gives its effect 
on labor productivity due to a small increase in A(i).  As in assumption 6, we suppose that at 
lower levels of technological complexity the second effect dominates, that is for A(i) <  ,  an 
increase in technological complexity increases the profitability of the sourcing firm by increasing 
productivity of the low tech input produced in the south than can be offset by an increase in 
technology transfer cost.   
*
, f i A
Proposition 5:  For reasons corresponding to proposition 1, for A(i) <  , 
*
, f i A
() ) (i A ∂
Ψ ∂  < 0.  
It reaches minimum at say  and then it rises. With this proposition, equation (12) has been 
depicted graphically in figure 2
*
, f i A
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Figure 2: Tradeoff between northern production and Vertical FDI 
 
                                                 
8 The curvature and slope of the curve depends on parameters like  δ ξ φ α and z   , , ,
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The prevalence of DO below  f A ) (i and above 
f A ) (i can be explained as in case of international 
outsourcing.  
Proposition 6: Only at intermediate levels of technological complexity is vertical FDI preferred 
to domestic outsourcing. At low and high levels of technological sophistication, domestic 
outsourcing dominates vertical FDI. 
 
Proposition 7: To host VFDI contracts with the full range of technological complexity, the host 
country should possess a minimum level of absorptive capacity. Analogously, the range of 
technological complexity available for intra-firm contracts can be increased if the absorptive 
capacity is raised. 
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. Thus VFDI expands at both ends with a rise in absorptive capacity. 
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Comparing International Outsourcing with VFDI 
To compare the profit functions of the sourcing firm in the two alternative regimes of 








= Θ  
() ()
() () ( ) () ( ) () () []






























































Using equation (9) and φ = ½, we can simplify the above equation to:   
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1 , and for  , either IO or DO exists, but not VFDI.    
    
b i A > ) (
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Let us now look at the partial derivative of Θ with respect to  ( ) i A . 
()
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() () () ()
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 , that is, as technological complexity increases, the profitability from VFDI increases if:  
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, that is, as technological complexity increases, the profitability from outsourcing 
increases if     
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Proposition 8:  If in equilibrium, international outsourcing occurs for technological complexity 
below ‘a’, then a small increase in technological complexity, still less than ‘a’, will induce a 
regime switch from international outsourcing to VFDI.  
 
Proposition 9: If in equilibrium, VFDI occurs in the range b i A a < < ) ( , then an increase in 
technological complexity in this range will switch the organizational form to international 
outsourcing. Thus, at higher level of technological complexity, the organizational form of 
fragmented production is likely to be an external one.  
 
We can consider two relevant and interesting cases that come up with this model. For z < ½, 
and technological complexity  () () 1 1 1
1
< + −





















− the function 
representing a MNC’s profitability with VFDI is more sensitive to A(i) than the similar function,  Ψ
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() [ ] AEC z L . , , 1 α φ for outsourcing
9. It is intuitive because at low z
10, there is higher probability for 
the sourcing firm to consider a VFDI contract vis-à-vis outsourcing (Antràs, 2005). Then, if we 
introduce technology transfer costs, the sourcing firm has to take into account these costs to 
offshore the input. Transfer costs are a convex function of technological complexity and hence 
raise the sensitivity of the MNC in an intra-firm transfer vis-à-vis external contract at low z.   
In figure 3, we consider the case of low z and therefore we have drawn the VFDI curve 
steeper than the IO curve. At high relative northern wages,ω , if international outsourcing 
equilibrium occurs below technological complexity a, then there is a tendency to switch to VFDI 
(equation 13, proposition 8). The figure shows that, low levels of technological complexity, 
below  o A ) (i  goes with DO only. For the range of technological complexity between  o A ) (i and P, 
we may have IO and between P and a, we have VFDI. Again, between a and 







 for  a i A > ) ( .  
It is observed that the rate of growth of wages in countries which host offshoring 
contracts is very high, at about 20% per annum. What do we expect of the relative prevalence of 
the two organizational forms of international production sharing? In figure 3, we show the impact 
of fall in northern relative wages from ω  to ω′. The bold lines define the new range of 
technological complexity for international production sharing. We observe a fall in off-shoring at 
the two ends of technological complexity. If the fall in wages is not large, the region for VFDI 
may not be impacted at all, while, on the other hand, if the fall in relative wages is very large, 
international outsourcing may be completely wiped out. Therefore, with a fall in north-south 
wage differential, one moves from multiple regime switch situation, where, the regime switches 
twice as the technological complexity increases, to a unique regime switch situation where the 
regime switches from VFDI to IO and finally if the wage differential is low enough, we have a 
situation of all pervasive VFDI. The result is intuitive because a fall in relative northern wages 
represents a loss in comparative advantage of the low wage south. As we have observed rising 
wages in offshoring destinations like India, our model suggests to build a new source of 
comparative advantage or else witness its growth and employment emanating from the off-
shoring industry fall. One such source of comparative advantage has been discussed in 
Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006), where better contracting institutions can influence the 
level of production sharing by impacting relative productivity of the final good sector.  There can 
                                                 
9 Assuming that this critical A(i) is lower than 
f i A ) ( , we draw the VFDI function steeper than the IO function at all levels of 
technological complexity.  
10 We assume that for z>½, the good to be high-tech and for z<½, the good is low-tech. 
  20 
be yet another source of comparative advantage, which is the host country’s absorptive capacity 
and technology expertise. A high level of absorptive capacity and proficiency in technology can 
sustain a higher technologically sophisticated good by lowering the cost of technology 
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Figure 3: Possibility of multiple switches for high-tech good 
 
For z > ½ along with other parametric restrictions on δ and α , the VFDI profitability function is 
less sensitive to technological complexity of the offshored input than the sourcing firm’s profit 
function  in IO. The intuition is again derived from Antràs (2005). The probability for outsourcing 
is higher for high z and hence the cost of the supplier assumes greater importance and making 
it more sensitive to technological complexity. Again, for A(i)>a, (from equation 14) the profit from 
IO is expected to be higher vis-à-vis VFDI. This implies that we would expect a low-tech input to 
be contracted internally for lower range of technological complexity but externally for higher A(i). 
In this case, if relative northern wages fall to a level say,ω′, then it is VFDI which is completely 
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Figure 4: Possible Regimes with low-tech good 
 
 
Section 4: Discussion 
 
A point worth noting is that, in both the cases above, it is always outsourcing which is 
preferred at higher levels of technological complexity of the offshored input irrespective of the 
value of z. This is because at higher levels of A(i), the high cost of technology transfer is a 
strong disincentive for the sourcing firm to undertake an intra-firm production transfer.  In case 
of VFDI the MNC makes RSI in technology transfer while the ensuing productivity gain is shared 
by the supplier as well. As the technological complexity crosses a threshold, the MNC is no 
longer willing to bear the cost of technology transfer and is better off sharing a larger part of the 
surplus in return for the unaffiliated party’s RSI in technology transfer. Our result shares a 
similarity with Bartel et al (2005). An increase in the speed of technology, in their model, 
encourages domestic outsourcing vis-à-vis intra-firm production transfer. Our model proposes 
that a firm with higher complexity of technology will always choose to outsource it provided the 
host country has a threshold level of absorptive capacity. The forces driving similar results in the 
two models are however different. In the closed economy model of Bartel et al (2005), 
acceleration in the pace of technological change raises the technology adoption costs of the 
final good firm and hence increases the per-period unit cost of producing in-house. This shifts 
the demand for outsourcing outwards irrespective of its service price because it allows firms to 
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use services based on leading edge technologies without incurring the large and recurrent fixed 
costs of adopting these new technologies.  
Perhaps a widely held notion is that firms do not outsource the production of 
technologically complex inputs. The trend to buy technologically complex inputs from unaffiliated 
suppliers is not completely absent though. For instance, Dell contracts out the design for 
notebooks, Personal Computers, digital televisions. Hewlett-Packard seeks external assistance 
to develop servers and printers.  Motorola purchases designs for its cheapest phones from 
unaffiliated suppliers. These firms acquire complete designs of digital devices from Asian 
developers, and modify them to suit their own specifications, and finally stamp their own brand 
name. The trend is fast spreading from electronics sector to navigation systems, pharmaceutical 
and even consumer goods. For example, Boeing is working with HCL Technologies, an Indian 
third party service provider, to co-develop software ranging from navigation systems and landing 
gear to the cockpit controls. Similarly, 20% of Procter & Gamble’s new product ideas come from 
external source. The reason for outsourcing complex technological products within the basic 
stage of production can also be rationalized by the fact that these products require specialized 
skills and knowledge which can be offered by only a broad network of specialists. That is 
perhaps the reason why many pharmaceutical companies have begun to outsource basic 
research
11. To ensure that the possibility of outsourcing at higher technological complexity does 
not remain a theoretical opportunity only, we need a dynamic involvement by the host country in 
globalization. The model thus delivers implications for the need of an active technology policy in 
the host country. Since the sourcing firm is not likely to make an intra-firm production contract at 
high levels of technological complexity, the host country government should subsidize the 
domestic vendors’ technology investment so as to enhance its overall participation in the global 
production.  
Some leading companies have simultaneously adopted a mix of captive and outsourced 
services wherein some of the more complex and core processes are being handled by the 
captive unit. Credit card companies, for instance, have complex technologies in place to analyze 
customer behavior. If a country has low absorptive capacity, its third party outsourcing service 
providers may get trapped in low value-add work as is depicted in figure 3. Given the possibility 
of multiple switches, it is possible for a TPV to jump to high value add and technologically 
complex work if the country enhances its absorptive capacity through investment in human 
                                                 
11 In contrast to Antràs (2005), Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005) show that firms closer to technology frontier (intensive in high 
tech input) are more likely to outsource to focus on R&D. It is likely that the inputs of a high-tech good are more technologically 
complex than the inputs of a low tech good. Thus, their model is also capable of generating a result similar to ours that more 
technologically complex inputs are outsourced. 
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capital and the TPV makes conscious effort to acquire and invest in technology. An increase in 
absorptive capacity decreases the cost of technology transfer and hence raises profitability of 
the sourcing firm. When z is low, VFDI is more sensitive to technological complexity and it is 
likely VFDI increases as a result of a rise in absorptive capacity vis-à-vis IO. However, as z, 
rises with time due to standardization, it is outsourcing which benefits as a result of rising 
absorptive capacity. When offshoring began in India, it was limited to low end jobs like call 
centers. TPV Companies like Progeon and Wipro Spectramind
12 have proved that the ability to 
handle complex processes can be acquired overtime. 
A dynamic interpretation of our result is also possible. Consider figure 3. A recent trend 
in the offshoring business is the method of “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) whereby a TPV uses 
its knowledge and skills of the local market to create an offshore production unit on behalf of a 
multinational firm. When this unit reaches a critical mass, a certain level of maturity, the 
multinational takes over and is transferred by the TPV. The offshore unit is then called a captive 
unit or a subsidiary of the MNC. For example, Aviva Plc, a United Kingdom-headquartered 
insurer, testing the waters in the Indian market, decided to opt for the BOT model. This model 
can explain the movement from IO to VFDI typically in a high-tech final good. Now consider 
figure 3 and 4. A switch from VFDI to outsourcing mode is likely with time as the captive 
supplier’s maturity evolves. This is exemplified by GECIS to GENPACT
13 transition in December 
2004. GECIS was a subsidiary of GE in India and in the year 2004, it transformed to a TPV after 
eight years of operations in India. Such a transition is predicted in our model for both the low-
tech and high-tech final goods.  
Empirical evidence relating to our model is found in Borga and Zeile (2004). They 
regress the volume of intra-firm trade on a number of parent firm related factors, host country 
characteristics and affiliate related variables. Affiliate R&D intensity is found to be negatively 
related to the volume of intra-firm trade. We can interpret R&D intensity of affiliate to be some 
measure of technological complexity the fragmented good’s input. The result is thus supposed 
to mean that as the technological complexity of the input rises, the probability of VFDI falls. The 
second important result of Borga and Zeile (2004) that is crucial for our paper relates to the 
education standards of the host country and its income. Their results confirm that the volume of 
intra-firm trade falls if the host country has higher levels of education or income. This matches 
                                                 
12 Progeon, a subsidiary of Infosys, has concrete plans to enter into more complex BPO activities as part of its expansion strategy. 
Moving in the direction, Progeon has formed a partnership with Aceva Technologies Inc to offer finance and accounting solutions. 
Wipro Spectramind is the second largest third-party offshore BPO providing services in insurance processing, telemarketing, 
mortgage processing, and technical support services apart from customer services.  
13 More and more captive spin-offs like that of British Airways-WNS, SwissAir-TCS, Conseco-EXL and GECIS-Genpact are 
expected to take place in the Indian scenario as the absorptive capacity in India rises. 
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with our model’s intuition. As the absorptive capacity increases, the host country can be a 
ground for more technologically complex products. Since higher technological complexity is 
more compatible with outsourcing, our model predicts a fall in intra-firm trade with rise in 
absorptive capacity especially so for low-tech products.  
 
Section 5: Conclusion 
 
This paper builds on the framework provided by Antràs (2005). We emphasize the importance 
of contractual differences between the VFDI and outsourcing and propose that in case of an 
intra-firm production transfer, a significant proportion of the technology transmission cost is 
borne by the sourcing firm. Per contra, in a relationship with an outside contractor, the cost of 
technology acquisition or assimilation assumes more importance which is undertaken by the 
supplier. This assumption adds to the results in Antràs (2005) model and shows the possibility 
of multiple regime switches. Specifically, in Antràs (2005), VFDI is preferred to outsourcing if the 
intensity of high-tech input is high. However, in our model, we have an additional factor, the 
technological complexity of the offshored input which is also a critical variable in internalization 
decision of the firm.  Only if the high-tech input is matched with intermediate range of 
technological complexity of the offshored input, is the VFDI mode preferred. This is because 
high technological complexity increases the cost of technology transfer for the MNC. The 
sourcing firm’s profitability from VFDI mode is more sensitive to technological complexity if the 
final good is high-tech. Hence, the MNC prefers to have intra-firm contracts only for intermediate 
range of technological complexity. On the other hand, even if z is high, the sourcing firm may 
still want to transfer production internally if the complexity of offshored input is low. This is again 
explained by the sensitivity of the profit functions in the two alternative modes and the incidence 
of technology transfer costs. 
A dynamic interpretation of our model may be used to explain a BOT relationship as well 
as recent transitions from captive units like GE Capital to GENPACT or British Airways to WNS. 
In future, it may be valuable to broaden this paper by looking at the relative growth and welfare 
effects of VFDI and outsourcing on the host country. Another useful extension can make the 
current model dynamic, where technology becomes more complex with each instant and 
improves productivity along with evolution of absorptive capacity. This brings in a new meaning 
of comparative advantage for the host country. In such a model we would certainly expect 
absorptive capacity to form an important basis for increasing greater participation in global 
production. 
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